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ABSTRACT 
 The National Defense Strategy has directed the Department of Defense to reform 
its business processes. The Department of the Navy has reformed its funding model 
within Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and is in the process of changing the 
funding model for Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC). NAVSEA 
converted naval shipyards from a working capital funding model to a mission funding 
model during fiscal years 1998 through 2007, while NAVFAC will complete its 
transition in fiscal year 2020. 
 This research analyzes the complexities of the working capital  funding model 
and mission funding model as they relate to the NAVSEA and NAVFAC transitions. The 
analysis illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of the transition to determine 
whether Marine Corps Logistics Command should follow suit and transition its Depot 
Maintenance Activity Group to a mission funding model. 
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As the Cold War ended and Desert Storm came to a close, the Department of Navy 
(DoN) prepared to eliminate widespread inefficiencies among its fleet and operations. In 
1994, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) launched its Regional Maintenance Plan 
(RMP), and in doing so, reduced redundancies in organizational structure, modernized its 
depot maintenance, and began the transition from a working capital fund to a mission-
funded model. The DoN faced many challenges implementing the funding model change 
across the shipyards resulting in a five-year delay in fully implementing the RMP. Even 
with all the challenges that naval shipyards faced during their transition, the DoN is moving 
forward with changing the funding model of Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
(NAVFAC) from a working capital fund to mission funding. NAVFAC is making its 
transition to streamline and reduce funding complexities  to achieve a model that is audit 
ready. 
The goal of a working capital fund is to break even over time rather than make 
profit. Gains or losses from one year to the next are factored into the rate that is charged to 
working capital fund customers in the following years in order to achieve an accumulated 
operating result of zero over time. In recent years, Marine Corps Logistics Command 
(MARCORLOGCOM) has experienced challenges of ensuring that their net operating 
results achieve this goal for its Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG). Due to these 
challenges, the Marine Corps needs to determine whether the reasons that led to the DoN 
changing the Naval shipyards and NAVFAC’s funding model apply to 
MARCORLOGCOM and influence the decision to change MARCORLOGCOM’s funding 
model. MARCORLOGCOM’s Marine Corps Supply Management (SMAG) provides 
enterprise-level inventory management under a working capital fund model, but unlike the 
DMAG, the SMAG has not experienced similar challenges. As a result, the thesis will not 
evaluate whether MARCORLOGCOM should transition the SMAG to a mission-funded 
model. 
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The thesis identifies the advantages and disadvantages between the working capital 
fund and mission-funded models. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the United 
States Marine Corps should transition MARCORLOGCOM’s depot maintenance structure 
to a mission-funded model in order to provide a better managed enterprise level capability 
to the Marine Corps. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to examine the benefits, drawbacks, and challenges 
of changing from a working capital fund profile to a mission-funded profile. This research 
will illustrate the issues and lessons learned to determine whether additional 
commands/structures should transition funding profiles. 
This research will analyze the funding model transition of the naval shipyards. This 
will illustrate efficiencies that were realized as well as the challenges that the Naval 
Shipyards battled through to make a successful transition. This research will also examine 
the reasons for NAVFAC’s current transition to a mission-funded model. 
The primary goal of the research is to determine whether the Marine Corps should 
transition MARCORLOGCOM DMAG to a mission-funded model for ground equipment. 
C. SCOPE 
The purpose of this research is to 
• Explain the differences between working capital fund and mission funding 
profiles 
• Describe the reason for DoN to restructure the funding profiles of naval 
shipyards and NAVFAC 
• Identify the short- and long-term effects of different funding profiles of 
naval shipyards 




The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following: 
• Reviewing the federal budget process for both working capital funds and 
mission funding 
• Conducting a literature review of the background of the reason for the Naval 
Shipyards transition 
• Conducting a literature review of the impacts of the Naval Shipyard 
transition 
• Examining the factors in the decision to transition NAVFAC to mission 
funding 
• Comparing the lessons learned from the Naval Shipyard and NAVFAC 
transition to Marine Corps depot maintenance structure 
E. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized by the following: 
• Chapter I is the introduction. 
• Chapter II defines the Marine Corps maintenance organization, mission 
funding, and working capital fund profiles. 
• Chapter III details the transition of Naval Shipyards and NAVFAC. 
• Chapter IV analyzes the effects of changing Marine Corps Depot 
Maintenance to a mission-funded profile. 
• Chapter V discusses the findings and recommendations for further research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Before analyzing the Naval Shipyard and NAVFAC case studies, this chapter will 
define how intermediate and depot maintenance is conducted and organized within the 
Navy and the Marine Corps. This chapter will also discuss the origination and purposes of 
the working capital and mission-funded funding profiles and the rules that govern them. 
A. MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 
The RMP integrated intermediate maintenance and depot maintenance for the DoN, 
and the following section defines intermediate and depot maintenance and the 
organizations responsible for the DoN and Marine Corps.  
1. Categories of Maintenance 
The DoD categorizes maintenance into three categories: organization-level, 
intermediate-level, and depot-level. Organization-level maintenance is not applicable for 
the purpose of this thesis.  
a. Intermediate-Level Maintenance 
For the Marine Corps, intermediate-level maintenance “normally consists of 
calibration, repair, or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or 
assemblies; the emergency manufacture of nonavailable parts; and providing technical 
assistance to using organizations” (USMC, 2016a, p. 1–5). Intermediate-level maintenance 
can include both corrective and preventative maintenance, but most using units1 do not 
possess the capability to perform all echelons of intermediate-level maintenance. For those 
units that do not possess adequate intermediate maintenance capabilities, intermediate 
maintenance facilities exist that have a sole mission to provide this capability. Intermediate 
maintenance is typically conducted by a combination of civilians and service members for 
the Marine Corps and the DoN. 
                                                 
1 A using unit is the organization that owns and operates a piece of equipment. 
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Intermediate-level maintenance of naval ships consists of 
• preventive maintenance 
• corrective maintenance 
• tests and inspections 
• provision of services such as electrical power, water, gas, and air 
replenishment, and tool issue 
• installation of alteration 
• work on electronic circuit boards, components, modules, subassemblies, 
and other equipment coded for intermediate-level repair 
• calibration and repair services for electrical and electronic test and 
monitoring equipment; pressure, vacuum, and temperature measuring 
devices; and mechanical measuring instruments 
• technical assistance to ship’s force in diagnosing system or equipment 
problems and assistance in repairs, as necessary 
• assistance in the emergency repair and manufacture of unavailable 
replacement parts or assemblies. (DoN, 2019a, pp. 5–2 - 5–3) 
b. Depot-Level Maintenance 
Depot-level maintenance is the highest level of maintenance and typically consists 
of major overhauls of equipment that require a complete rebuild of end items and/or 
assemblies/subassemblies. At this level, manufacturing of parts may be required as well as 
modifications and testing. Depot-level maintenance is typically conducted by civilian 
artisans in facilities that solely focus on depot maintenance. Depot-maintenance personnel 
provide technical assistance and perform maintenance that subordinate-level personnel and 
facilities are unable to perform. 
2. Marine Corps Maintenance Organizations 
The Marine Corps is expeditionary in nature, and in order for using units to be 
expeditionary as well, heavy maintenance footprints required to perform all levels of 
maintenance do not reside at every using unit. The Marine Corps has structured itself with 
organizations that solely focus on intermediate- and depot-level maintenance. In addition 
to providing their respective level of maintenance, they also provide assistance to 
subordinate or adjacent maintenance facilities or personnel. 
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a. Intermediate Maintenance 
Similar to the DoN, the Marine Corps has dedicated force structure and facilities 
for intermediate maintenance. For the Marine Corps, there are four Maintenance Battalions 
tasked with the mission of “intermediate maintenance support for Marine Corps-furnished 
tactical ordnance, engineering, motor transport, communications-electronics, and general 
support equipment” (United States Marine Corps [USMC], 2016, p. 7–14). Three of the 
Maintenance Battalions are active-duty maintenance battalions that are collocated and 
provide support to their respective Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and there is one 
reserve Maintenance Battalion that is dispersed across the United States providing support 
to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). Each Maintenance Battalion provides 
technical support and conducts maintenance of ground equipment of their respective 
supported using units above and beyond what can be performed by the using unit. If a 
Maintenance Battalion is unable to perform the level of maintenance required or the 
equipment requires a major overhaul, the equipment will be sent to a depot maintenance 
facility to complete the required level of maintenance. 
b. Depot Maintenance 
MARCORLOGCOM is responsible for conducting all depot-level maintenance for 
the Marine Corps. MARCORLOGCOM conducts depot maintenance at three different 
facilities: Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB) Albany, MCLB Barstow, and Blount 
Island Command. In contrast to the DoN, none of these facilities is collocated with 
intermediate maintenance capabilities or within the same command structure. MCLB 
Albany in Albany, GA, and MCLB Barstow in California conduct the majority of depot 
maintenance for MARCORLOGCOM with a small percentage of depot maintenance 
completed at Blount Island Command in Jacksonville, FL. Outside of some specific 
circumstances, the depot maintenance capabilities of MCLB Albany and MCLB Barstow 
are mirrored allowing each to perform maintenance across all types of ground equipment. 
A mixture of government civilians and contractors perform all maintenance functions at 
MARCORLOGCOM. 
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3. Depot Maintenance Regulations 
Providing a depot maintenance capability is a very time extensive and costly effort 
for the DoD to maintain a force in readiness. The DoD is unable to conduct depot 
maintenance without relying on the resources of the Defense OIB in its entirety to provide 
depot-level maintenance. Depot-level maintenance is a multi-billion-dollar annual 
requirement that spans government and commercial entities of Defense OIB. With the size 
and influence of this capability, additional guidelines have been instituted to regulate depot 
maintenance regardless of the funding model. 
a. Employee End Strength 
Depot-level maintenance employs a large number of civilian employees, including 
both government and contracted employees. Employee end strength numbers are not 
permitted to be set by any organization goals, they “shall be managed solely on the basis 
of the available workload and the funds made available for such depot-level maintenance 
and repair” (Prohibition on Management of Depot Employees by End Strength, 2007). This 
prevents the creation of a workforce that is incapable of completing the assigned depot 
maintenance workload. 
b. Performance of Depot Level Maintenance of Materiel 
The DoD has a Title 10 responsibility to maintain a core logistics capability and 
must ensure that  
not more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a 
military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and 
repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal 
Government personnel of such workload for the military department or the 
Defense Agency. (Limitations on the Performance of Depot-Level 
Maintenance of Materiel, 2011)  
This responsibility ensures that a majority of the depot maintenance performed will be 
completed by government owned employees rather than contracted personnel or services. 
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c. Capital Investment 
Congress has delineated a list of depots that perform depot maintenance that are 
deemed “covered.” MCLB Albany and MCLB Barstow have been appointed as covered 
depots, and being a covered depot, there is a minimum level of investment that must occur 
on capital assets. Capital assets consist of “physical plant and property, (including 
government owned facilities, property acquired under a capital lease, leasehold 
improvements to property acquired under a capital lease or an operating lease), equipment 
and software” (DoD Financial Management Regulation 1994, p. 58–8). For each of the 
covered depots, the owning service must invest a minimum of “six percent of the average 
total combined workload funded at all the depots of that military department for the 
preceding three fiscal years” (John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2007, 2006, p. 69) and not include any costs associated with sustainment and upkeep 
of facilities. This measure aims to ensure that consistent investment in infrastructure and 
equipment will facilitate mid- and long-term cost reductions (DoD Financial Management 
Regulation, 1994). 
B. FUNDING 
There are two funding models that resource the DoD. The first of which is through 
annual appropriations, while the second is through working capital funds also known as 
revolving funds. Each funding model has evolved from their initial existence, but each has 
their own set of rules that govern their use and execution. These rules that govern each 
have their own advantages and disadvantages in how they are instituted to achieve the 
mission of the organizations they support. 
1. Mission Funding 
Mission funding is synonymous with direct congressional appropriation and is the 
resourcing solution to fund all Marine Corps operations. Mission funding is what the 
Marine Corps uses to reimburse working capital funds for services rendered. 
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a. Origin 
The U.S. Constitution laid the groundwork for congressional appropriations by 
granting Congress “the power of the purse.” Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
grants congress “power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” and 
Article 1, Section 9 directs that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” These two articles provide the U.S. 
government the ability to generate funds and authorize the use of government funds. 
Originally, Congress approved funding for specific line items before the formation of 
appropriation. To this day, Congress appropriates funds via laws generated in Congress 
and signed into law by the president of the United States. 
b. Congressional Budget Process 
The DoD receives funding through various appropriation bills, and it receives its 
authority to spend through the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act, both of 
which are approved annually. Both the National Defense Authorization Act and the 
appropriation bills must be approved before the DoD is permitted to spend any funds. 
(1) Appropriations Bills 
After Congress receives the president’s budget in February each year, Congress 
will commence hearings in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Each house 
will meet in their respective appropriation committees and subcommittees to lay the 
framework for their respective budget resolutions. The respective budget resolutions will 
be debated in each house before returning to a conference committee to resolve any issues 
that were raised during debate. Once the resolutions are reworked, they will return to the 
floor for voting or additional debate. This process continues until the resolution receives 
the required level of support and forwarded to the president to be signed into law. Twelve 
appropriations fund governmental discretionary spending. Each has its own respective 
appropriation subcommittee. 
• Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies; 
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• Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies; 
• Defense; 
• Energy and Water Development; 
• Financial Services and General Government; 
• Homeland Security; 
• Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies; 
• Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies; 
• Legislative Branch; 
• Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies; 
• State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs; 
• Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related 
Agencies. (Saturno, 2016, pp. 1–2) 
(2) Authorization Acts 
While the appropriation bills grant funding for discretionary funding, authorization 
acts grant authority for spending for mandatory programs as well as grant the 
authorities/guidelines for discretionary spending. The National Defense Authorization Act 
is generated within each house of Congress in their respective Armed Services Committees 
and follows a similar process as appropriation bills. The process for both appropriation 
bills and authorization acts occur concurrently and signed into law by the president. 
(3) Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) 
If congressional action occurs in timely manner, both the authorization act and 
appropriation bills are signed into law by the  president by September 30 each year in order 
to have obligational authority by the first day of the new fiscal year, October 1. If congress 
fails to meet their obligatory requirement of agreeing on a budget, the federal government 
will be unable to conduct regular business. Congress can pass a temporary CRA that will 
grant temporary budget authority to continue operating until a budget resolution can be 
agreed upon in Congress. The CRA will set a maximum rate at which the authorized agency 
can incur obligations. The rate will typically be set at a percentage of the previous fiscal 
year’s authority, but the DoD will not be able to start any new projects until Congress 
passes a budget resolution (Saturno, 2016). 
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c. Appropriation Classification 
There are three main types of appropriations classifications: annual, multi-year, and 
no year appropriations. Annual appropriations are available for one fiscal year, which is 
defined by 1 October to September 30. These appropriations are authorized and 
appropriated by Congress each year and mainly fund everyday operations within the DoD. 
An example of an annual appropriation is operations and maintenance (O&M). Multi-year 
appropriations are authorized and appropriated by congress for programs that typically 
cannot be completely executed within one fiscal year of execution. Examples are military 
construction (five-year) and procurement (three-year) appropriations. No-year 
appropriations are funds that are appropriated and are available until the funds are 
expended. Working capital funds are typically created with a no-year appropriation and 
will be defined later in this chapter (GAO, 2016). 
d. Appropriation Law 
DoD obtains the ability to obligate funds and expense funds from the treasury from 
the appropriation bills and authorization acts. Both of which must be written into law by 
the president and come with regulations that stipulate and govern their use. Many rules 
govern appropriated funds,2 but three main statues govern their execution. These rules are 
typically described as the purpose, time, and amount statutes or authorities. 
(1) Purpose 
Known as the purpose statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1301 states that “appropriations shall be 
applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise 
provided by law” (Application, 1982). An expense must satisfy a three-part test to justify 
if the purchase is considered a proper: 
1. The expenditure must bear a logical relationship to the appropriation 
sought to be charged. In other words, it must make a direct contribution 
to carrying out either a specific appropriation or an authorized agency 
function for which more general appropriations are available. 
2. The expenditure must not be prohibited by law. 
                                                 
2 Mission funds and appropriated funds are used interchangeably. 
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3. The expenditure must not be otherwise provided for, that is, it must not 
be an item that falls within the scope of some other appropriation or 
statutory funding scheme. (General Accounting Office [GAO], 2004) 
(2) Time 
U.S. Code § 1502 is referred to as the time statute and governs that funds must be 
executed within the period of availability of the applicable appropriation (Balances 
Available, 1982). As indicated above, there are different periods of availability for 
appropriations ranging from one year to an indefinite length. In order to satisfy the time 
statute, an obligation or purchase can only occur during the period of availability for new 
obligations. An appropriation is considered expired after the period of availability ends, 
but the appropriation is available for adjustments or liquidations for a period of five 
additional years. An appropriation will become expired after the five cancelled period ends. 
Once an appropriation is expired, it will no longer be available for any expenditures or 
adjustments. 
(3) Amount 
Known as the amount statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 stipulates a government employee 
may not 
• Make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount 
available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation. 
• Involve either government in a contract or obligation for the payment of 
money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by law. 
(Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts, 1982) 
Essentially, a government employee must not agree to make or complete a purchase that 
exceeds the funding levels that they are authorized. Any employees violating this statute is 
considered to be committing an Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation and subject to 
administrative and penal punishments.  
• Accepting voluntary services for the United States, or employing 
personal services not authorized by law, except in cases of emergency 
involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. 
(Limitation on Voluntary Services, 1982) 
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• Making obligations or expenditures in excess of an apportionment or 
reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by agency 
regulations (Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures, 1982). 
e. Budget Execution 
Once a budget is approved and signed into law, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) will apportion funds to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with 
quarterly apportionment amounts. The quarterly amounts originated out of the ADA to 
prevent government agencies from spending their apportioned funds at rate in which the 
funds were exhausted prior to the end of the fiscal year. After the DoD receives its 
apportionment, it will sub-apportion funds to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial 
Management and Comptroller) (ASN[FM&C]), who will then allocate funds to its 
subordinate responsible offices.3 The Commandant of the Marine Corps is the responsible 
office for all Marine Corps appropriations, receiving its funds directly from ASN(FM&C). 
Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) Programs and Resources (P&R) issues operating 
budgets (OPBUDs) to its subordinate commands, and funds are allocated and allotted in 
the accounting systems. Once the funds are received at the subordinate levels, delegation 
of authority to their subordinate commands is implied, and the funds are available to be 
obligated and expended in accordance with regulations. (USMC, 2015) 
2. Navy Working Capital Fund 
The Navy Working Capital Fund is a revolving fund that finances its operations 
with its working capital and bills its customers a set rate each year to recoup all costs. 
Customers pay the set rate with either mission funds or working capital funds. This type of 
fund allows for much more flexibility as a working capital fund does not have fiscal year 
limitations that appropriated funds have levied upon them. This flexibility allows the 
working capital fund to operate more like a commercial business than a typical federal 
entity and is governed by a different set of rules than that of appropriated funds. 
                                                 
3 A responsible office is an organization that “has been assigned the responsibility for overall 




The purpose of working capital funds is to finance operations that function like that 
of a commercial business. The working capital fund allow the entity to leverage enterprise 
purchasing power and be able to track the total costs to provide goods and services to the 
customer. Using working capital funds: 
• Provides for total cost visibility and improved cost awareness 
• Enables full cost recovery (capital costs can’t be exceeded and money is 
saved for additional programming) 
• Stabilizes rates to protect customers from inflation during execution 
• Gives managers more flexibility by knowing the true cost of their 
decisions 
• Shifts the focus from spending to cost and cash management 
• Minimizes costs because customers determine what they need and can 
justify their decisions and funding allocation 
• Measures performance and promotes greater taxpayer accountability 
• Allows for greater flexibility and security in decision-making, as there 
are no fiscal year limitations. (Potvin, 2011, p. 108) 
(2) Formation 
Revolving funds have been in place for the DoD for well over 100 years. 
Historically, stock funds and industrial funds were revolving funds. Stock funds were 
created to manage enterprise level supply accounts, while industrial funds were created to 
manage enterprise-level maintenance and research and development. The authorization to 
create working capital funds was born out of the National Security Act Amendment of 
1949. The amendment authorized the DoD to create working capital funds to effectively 
control and account for programs and work that the DoD performs to finance inventories 
and industrial-type activities (National Security Act of 1947, 1949). Title 10, Section 2208 
codified DoD’s ability to establish working capital funds (Working-Capital Funds, 1962), 
and in 1991, DoD combined the individual industrial and stock funds into a single 
revolving fund called the Defense Business Operations Fund. In 1996, the DoD broke up 
the Defense Business Operations Fund into five different working capital funds due to the 
difficulty in centrally managing one large revolving fund. DoD created the following 
revolving funds in place of the Defense Business Operations Fund: 
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• Air Force Working Capital Fund 
• Navy Working Capital Fund 
• Army Working Capital Fund 
• Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund 
• Defense Commissary Agency Working Capital Fund (Purdy & 
Williams, 2018) 
(3) Revolving Fund Requirements 
Before a working capital fund can be approved and established, the following 
criteria must be met: 
• Outputs (i.e., goods produced and services provided) can be identified; 
• An approved accounting system is available; 
• Organizations (i.e., customers) that require and order products or 
services have been identified; and 
• Advantages and disadvantages of establishing a buyer/seller relationship 
have been evaluated. (Potvin, 2011, p. 108) 
b. Budget Process 
Working capital funds begin with an initial influx of cash, referred to as a corpus. 
The corpus can either be from a direct appropriation from Congress or a transfer of assets 
from one or a mix of appropriations. After the initial corpus, the working capital fund does 
not receive any additional appropriated funds. The working capital fund finances its 
operations with the corpus, and as it provides services to its customers, the rate billed to 
the customer is used to reimburse the working capital fund. The rate that is charged to the 
customer is determined two years in advance. 
Each year, the working capital fund prepares an operating budget as well as a capital 
investment plan in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2476. Their budget will include all operating 
costs including all direct, indirect, and general/administrative costs. The capital investment 
plan will include all costs to improve automated data processing (ADP) and 
telecommunications equipment, non-ADP equipment, software development, and minor 
construction projects. In the Marine Corps, these budget submissions are sent to HQMC 
P&R before being sent to Navy Office of the Budget for Business and Civilian Resources 
Division (FMB-4) to be included in the Navy Working Capital Fund budget books 
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submission. FMB-4 approves the rate that will be charged to customers during year of 
execution to reimburse work financed by the working capital fund. 
c. Appropriation Law 
The following regulations have been enacted to govern depot maintenance 
operations under a working capital fund model. 
(1) Cash Management 
Components are required to maintain a level of cash with the treasury to ensure that 
a positive level of cash throughout the entire year. The operating cash target is determined 
by number of days of cash, and the days of cash target is determined by each service 
component. The level of cash must be able to support operational requirements and 
disbursement requirements. Failure to maintain positive cash flows will constitute an ADA 
violation. (DoD Financial Management Regulation, 2014) 
(2) Workload Management 
Current depot maintenance workloads are limited to completing 80 percent of the 
depot maintenance workload requirement (USMC, 2018). 
d. Budget Execution 
The annual billable rate is essential to the operation of a working capital fund. This 
rate is set in order to recoup all costs and break even at the end of the year. In order to 
determine the annual rate, management requires the required workload, cost to complete 
the workload, the accumulated operating result (AOR), and any mandated adjustments. 
The customer will determine the workload requirement during their Program Objective 
Memorandum process. After the workload is determined, the working capital fund will 
determine the estimated cost to perform the workload. This cost will be made up of the 
direct labor work years, production overhead costs, and the general and administrative 
overhead. The simplified rate formula is: 
Rate = (C – A + M) / O  where  C = estimated cost to perform workload 
     A = AOR adjustment 
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     M = Mandatory Adjustments 
     O = Output level (Candreva, 2017) 
This formula will be used each year to determine the annual rate, but FMB-4 
reserves the right to make adjustments to the rate before implementation. Rates are 




III. CASE STUDY 
A. CASE OF SHIPYARDS 
In the last 50 years, the DoN has reduced its shipyards from ten to four and 
transferred much of the work to the private shipyards for their maintenance (Comptroller 
General of the United States, 1973; GAO, 2017). The remaining four shipyards, Pearl 
Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyard, have focused their efforts on nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and 
submarines, providing repair and refueling (GAO, 2017). This consolidation continued 
with the integration of intermediate maintenance and depot maintenance to reduce 
infrastructure and create efficiencies in organization and business processes. 
1. Reason for Change 
After Desert Storm and facing drawdowns in budget and personnel, the Navy 
focused efforts on reducing inefficiencies and reducing excess cost and infrastructure. In 
1994, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) set out with his Regional Maintenance Plan (RMP) 
that directed efforts to streamline maintenance processes and systems. The RMP aimed to 
consolidate structure and facilities in its efforts to achieve $1.28 billion in anticipated 
savings (GAO, 1997). It was organized into three phases meant to span five years.  
• Phase 1 – Create regional repair centers and reduce redundancy across 
intermediate maintenance capacities 
• Phase 2 – Create regional maintenance centers by integrating 
intermediate and depot maintenance activities 
• Phase 3 – Conduct fleet maintenance with a single maintenance process 
(GAO, 1997) 
The RMP was aggressive in its timeline and goals, but the anticipated efficiencies 
in maintenance process and infrastructure were large enough to move forward and 
implement the plan. With such drastic changes in processes and procedures required to 
implement RMP, the DoN was permitted to move forward with a pilot program at the Pearl 
Harbor Naval Shipyard. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was uniquely advantaged due to 
20 
the closely proximity of intermediate maintenance facilities. This pilot would serve as a 
proof-of-concept model that the remaining shipyards could follow when they transitioned. 
Prior to the transition, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) commanded Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard, and Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) was their largest 
customer. As a result, the DoN put the integrated shipyard under command of PACFLT, 
but NAVSEA would remain the technical authority depot maintenance. This ultimately 
severed the seller-customer relationship of the working capital fund, making the seller and 
customer the same. Since PACFLT financed its operations with a mission-funded funding 
model, the decision was made to move the integrated Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility to a pure mission-funded funding model instead of a 
hybrid model. The DoN (2006) stated that “mission funding provides the best mechanism 
by which the Navy can match workforce skills with workload priorities and still meet 
fiduciary responsibilities” (p. 3). With this, the remaining shipyards transitioned to a 
mission-funded model regardless if they integrated with an intermediate maintenance 
facility. 
Before the DoN would be permitted to move forward and transition additional 
shipyards, Congress directed the DoN to provide test criteria to evaluate the Pearl Harbor 
pilot. The DoN developed nine test metrics to evaluate the pilot. The metrics compared the 
services that the integrated facility provided before and after the transition to determine if 
there was any loss in service or quality, timeliness of project completion, and cost 
reductions, but there were no specific metrics established to evaluate the impacts changing 
the financial structure of the shipyards. The results of the metrics were mixed and are 
discussed later in this chapter. The DoN did not establish metrics for the later Puget Sound 
two-year prototype (Department of Defense Inspector General [DODIG], 2005). 
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Table 1. Pearl Harbor Pilot Program Test Metrics. Adapted from GAO 
(1997). 
Metric Data Elements 
Total cost of a production shop, direct 
labor hour of work delivered to the 
customer 
Total costs of the ship maintenance activity 
Total production shop, direct labor hours delivered 
Total available labor hours expended to 
deliver a production shop, direct labor 
hour to the customer 
Total available labor hours, including direct and indirect 
hours, expended by the ship maintenance activity 
Total production shop, direct labor hours delivered 
Total Current Ship Maintenance 
Program (CSMP) work items 
completed 
Total number of CSMP work items completed on ships 
home ported at Pearl Harbor during the fiscal year 
Total Current Ship Maintenance 
Program work items in the backlog 
Total number of CSMP work items in the backlog for 
ships home ported at Pearl Harbor 
Schedule adherence of CNO 
maintenance projects 
Sum of the differences in the actual and scheduled 
completion dates for each CNO ship maintenance project 
completed during the fiscal year.  
Sum of the scheduled duration (number of days) for each 
CNO maintenance project completed during the fiscal 
year 
Rework index for CNO maintenance 
projects 
Sum of the labor hours expended to correct work 
deficiencies for each CNO scheduled ship 
maintenance project completed during the fiscal 
year 
Total production shop, direct labor hours delivered for 
each CNO scheduled ship maintenance project completed 
during the fiscal year 
Activity work schedule 
integrity index 
Budgeted quantity of work scheduled (labor days) 
Actual quantity of work performed (labor days) 
Casualty reports caused by 
activity work 
Casualty reports 
Earned value Actual quantity of work performed (labor days) for 
selected Ship Work Line Item Numbers for the fiscal year 
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2. Timeline 
Although the first stage of the RMP started to occur in 1994 with consolidation of 
intermediate maintenance facilities at Pearl Harbor (Turner, 2002), the Pearl Harbor Pilot 
program to integrate intermediate maintenance facilities and depot maintenance facilities 
did not occur until fiscal year 1998. Fiscal year 1998 was the transition year in which the 
integrated facility would be operated under both a working capital fund and a mission-
funded model until they fully transitioned to a singular mission-funded funding model the 
following year. After completion of the Pearl Harbor Pilot program, it was January of 2003 
when Congress approved DoN to transition an additional shipyard to the mission-funded 
model. Program Budget Decision 700C granted the DoN approval from Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) to conduct a two-year prototype at Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard. The results of the Puget Sound prototype were used in the fiscal year 2006 
president’s budget to request the transition of the remaining shipyards to a mission-funded 
model (DODIG, 2005). The remaining shipyards, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Norfolk 
Naval Shipyard, “transitioned to the direct funding mechanism on October 1, 2006, the 
earliest transition date that Congress had allowed” (GAO, 2017, p. 44). 
3. Changes 
Integrating intermediate maintenance facilities and naval shipyards under one 
structure affected change throughout the combined organization that created challenges 
that had to be addressed in order for the RMP to succeed and obtain the goals of the 
program. 
a. Command Structure 
As the largest customers, COMPACFLT took command of the integrated Pearl 
Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Atlantic Fleet took 
command of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and Norfolk Naval Shipyard. 
b. Infrastructure 
One of the main goals of the RMP was to reduce excess infrastructure. Starting with 
Pearl Harbor, the integration of shipyards and the intermediate maintenance facilities saw 
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a duplication of efforts in terms of capabilities including facilities and capital equipment. 
The combined structure allowed duplicative facilities to be reduced, and this was most 
evident with the machine and metal shops. These shops essentially completed similar work 
for both the intermediate and depot maintenance efforts. Combining the workforces 
permitted the shops to consolidate efforts into a single shop, and in some cases eliminated 
the need for entire buildings. The combined shops resulted in excess capital equipment that 
was no longer needed and could be sold off to recoup funds needed to buyout the working 
capital fund that will be discussed later in this chapter. The excess facilities were either 
destroyed or redistributed to other commands. The reduction in infrastructure resulted in 
reductions of operating costs to maintain and operate the facilities, and Pearl Harbor was 
able to realize approximately $300,000 in annual savings in operating costs (Turner, 2002). 
c. Funding Source 
Prior to the integration of the maintenance facilities, the shipyards operating under 
a working capital fund structure, and the intermediate maintenance facilities and PACFLT 
operating under a mission-funded model. Since PACFLT was the largest customer of the 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, DoN expected fewer issues under a mission-funded model 
rather than a working capital fund because PACFLT could incorporate the integrated 
facility into its existing structure preventing establishing another system (GAO, 1999). 
4. Impacts 
The funding model transition affected different areas within the shipyard and this 
section will illustrate the impacts to the management and operations of the integrated naval 
shipyards.  
a. Flexibility 
One of the greatest advantages of a working capital fund is its flexibility of being a 
revolving fund that does not receive an appropriation every year to fund its operations. It 
is not confined by a fiscal year like that of appropriated funds. Working capital funds do 
not have to wait until appropriation bills are passed to start operations each fiscal year 
allowing them to continue operations during a government shutdown awaiting legislation. 
24 
Transitioning to a mission-funded model eliminated this flexibility, but “limited flexibility 
was considered a minor factor compared with the overall benefits of using direct 
appropriations to fund the consolidation” (GAO, 2001, p. 16). Navy officials felt that “the 
flexibility provided by the [working capital fund] for activities to continue maintenance 
operations during periods without appropriations or continuing resolutions would extend 
only a few weeks” (GAO, 2001, p. 39). The 18 government shutdowns between 1976 and 
2016 only ranged from one to 21 days (Thompson, 2016), eliminating the need of the 
flexibility of working capital fund. 
Working capital funds have the capability to operate at a loss during the year as long 
as it maintains appropriate cash levels to prevent any ADA violations. Since the goal of a 
revolving fund is to break even over time, the losses or gains from one year to the next are 
recouped the following year by reducing or increasing the customer rate. Under the mission-
funded model, the shipyards are no longer have this capability. The shipyards would no longer 
be able to operate at any loss or produce gains over the year. Switching to a mission-funded 
model requires additional emphasis be placed on ensuring adherence to fiscal law. 
The intermediate maintenance budgeting remained similar to its historical process, 
but operating under a mission-funded model affected the budget process with respect to the 
depot maintenance. Historically, shipyards were managed with a business mindset, where 
the rate that they charged their customers covered all costs for the facility. This included 
the costs to manage and invest in the facility. Working under the mission-funded model, 
the budgeting for capital investment and facility sustainment must complete against other 
DoN priorities for funding. The needs of the greater naval force now affected whether the 
shipyards’ priorities would receive funding. The first year that the Pearl Harbor Naval 
Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility was under the mission-funded model, the 
DoN failed to fund the command to complete the projected workload for the year (GAO, 
2001). The loss of budget flexibility of the shipyards has seen its greatest impact on capital 
investment discussed later.  
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b. Visibility 
Federal regulations require ship maintenance reporting with additional 
requirements on depot level maintenance. “Statement of Federal Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 4 requires DoD and the Navy to continue to measure and report the full cost 
of such ship maintenance operations by responsibility segment” (GAO, 1999, p. 21), and 
title 10 U.S.C., Section 2466 requires the DoD to report the degree of depot level work 
completed by the DoD and the private sector. The new system in which the integrated 
shipyard operates was incapable of satisfying both of these statues. The shipyard 
management system used prior to the transition allowed data to be gathered and reported 
to the appropriate entities. The shipyards were required to use all costs to determine their 
annual customer rate. However, after the transition to the mission-funded model, 
determining the overhead costs became extremely difficult. The new rate charged to 
customers after the integration did not include overhead costs, and after the Pearl Harbor 
pilot, officials at the shipyard and PACFLT felt there was no longer a need to determine 
overhead costs by commodity since they were no longer needed to determine the customer 
rate (GAO, 2001). Failure to track the costs appropriately did not satisfy reporting 
requirements, and this became apparent as attempts were made to estimate costs to satisfy 
these regulations. Estimates proved to be “imprecise at best” (GAO, 2001, p. 15). Under 
the new structure, the overhead costs were spread across different commands and 
appropriations and were not centrally tracked routinely.  
Table 2. Examples of Overhead Costs No Longer Paid Directly by 
Shipyards. Adapted from Frisk (2007). 
Overhead Type New Payor Under Mission Funding 
Navy Marine Corps Intranet Navy Fleets 
Utilities Chief of Naval Installations 
Sustainment, Restoration, and 
Modernization 
Chief of Naval Installations 
Military Labor Bureau of Naval Personnel 
Other Procurement, Navy Naval Sea Systems Command or Navy Fleets 
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The GAO (2001) determined that “facilities and equipment depreciation, centrally 
managed financial and technical support services, selected base operating support costs, 
overhead costs by maintenance shop and work item, military personnel costs, [and] 
borrowed labor costs” were among the items that the integrated shipyard struggled to 
routinely track under the consolidated system (pp. 32–33). The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) felt that the DoN did not make efforts to develop a system to track overall 
depot maintenance costs because the level of detail was not requested (Frisk, 2007). 
c. Personnel 
Although workers could be borrowed interchangeably between the shipyard and 
the intermediate maintenance authority before the integration, this came with some 
difficulty. The two different workforces were funded differently and required procedures 
to permit workforce borrowing. The borrowing force was required to submit appropriate 
paperwork and transfer funds before workers were permitted to conduct maintenance for 
the requesting entity causing delays to maintenance schedules. As a result, between 100 
and 200 workers on average (GAO, 1999), up to 1,000 during Desert Storm (Frisk, 2007), 
were sent to an excess labor workshop daily to complete work not directly associated with 
maintaining ships. After the integration of the workforces, the barriers of borrowing 
workers were removed allowing workers to move between intermediate and depot 
maintenance projects. This significantly increased the flexibility of management to manage 
the workforce ensuring workers were gainfully employed towards the facility’s mission 
nearly eliminating the excess labor workforce. 
The integrated workforce reduced the number of management positions. The Pearl 
Harbor pilot eliminated 95 civilian overhead positions and allowed for the positions to be 
redesignated as direct maintenance positions (GAO, 1999). The redesignated positions 
resulted in anticipated savings, but the shipyard faced challenges as “several department 
directors and overhead supervisors said they were unwilling to release any personnel 
because of the increased workload due to changes in administrative and financial systems 
since the consolidation” (GAO, 2001, p. 51). The redesignated positions became positions 
of lower responsibility and pay, and the implementation failed to be implemented timely 
without the buy-in of the unionized workforce.  
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d. Cost to Transition 
When working capital funds are transferred to a mission-funded model, the 
appropriated fund must reimburse or buyout the working capital fund for all “liabilities, 
accumulated operating results (or net financial position), accrued employee leave, and 
undepreciated capital assets” (GAO, 2001). The regulations at the time of the Pearl Harbor 
consolidation outlined general procedures for the reimbursement and led to disagreements 
between the DoN and OSD, but the DoN reimbursed the working capital fund $18.4 million 
in 1999 until DoN and OSD could agree. The estimated buyout cost for the Puget Sound 
shipyard was over $140 million in 2006 and over $282 million combined for Norfolk and 
Portsmouth shipyards in 2007 (DON, 2006, 2007). 
e. Budget Execution 
Each shipyard experienced a transition period in which cost were tracked within 
the working capital fund and mission-funded models. If a project started as a working 
capital fund project, the costs were tracked until completion in the working capital fund. 
New projects were commenced under the mission-funded model. The Pearl Harbor pilot 
experienced the greatest turmoil in tracking costs within two funding models, as there were 
no guidelines governing transition procedures. The remaining shipyards learned from the 
trepidations that Pearl Harbor faced and transitioned funding models with more ease.  
Operating under the new mission-funded model, the shipyard competed against other 
DoN priorities for funding. In the first year of Pearl Harbor under a pure mission-funded model, 
the shipyard was not funded for the assigned workload leading to PACFLT transferring $30.8 
million during fiscal year 1999 to cover unfunded workload (GAO, 2001). As indicated in 
Table 2, the Pacific and Atlantic fleets were not the only commands fighting for funding for 
the shipyards, Chief of Naval Installations, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and NAVSEA was 
required to budget and compete for funding shipyard requirements. 
f. Capital Investment 
Prior to the transition, shipyards managed their capital investment and could 
increase rates to make capital purchases. Throughout the transition process, officials felt 
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that capital investment would suffer at the transition when shipyard investment competed 
against other DoN priorities. After the Pearl Harbor transition, DoN budgeted less than five 
percent in their capital investment program (GAO, 2001) which led to the mandated six 
percent requirement set in the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act.  
The compounding lack of adequate capital investment has led to capital equipment in 
service longer than its expected useful life. Shipyards’ facilities upkeep has led to an overall 
poor rating and 25 percent of facilities categorized as failing in 2016 (GAO, 2017). The earlier 
beginnings of the RMP was focused on reducing structure saw a reduction of 45 percent of 
building of the Pearl Harbor integration (Turner, 2002), but in 2013, there were 650 temporary 
structures being utilized across the four shipyards (GAO, 2017). The near-term goals of the 
RMP failed to account for increased maintenance requirements of the aging fleet leading to 
increased maintenance delays and loss of operational days of naval ships. The backlog of 
facility capital investment increased 41 percent between 2011 and 2016. This has led to the 
implementation of NAVSEA Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan Program Office and 
its current $21 billion optimization efforts to update and outfit the shipyards to support future 
Navy ship maintenance requirements (Norfolk, 2019). 
g. Pearl Harbor Test Metric Results 
Table 3 illustrates the results of the test metrics DoN evaluated the Pearl Harbor 
pilot. Cost per labor hour saw a reduction after the transition and total labor hours required 
to deliver a production shop labor hour to the customer. The remainder of the metrics were 
focused on the service quality and schedule adherence, but there were no specific metrics 
focused on the funding model. The DoN saw the funding model transition as a means to 
manage the workforce toward evolving priorities. The CBO conducted studies to determine 
the impacts of the funding model on operation performance and was unable to find a 
relationship, but they determined that “working-capital funding may lead to 
underutilization of shipyards’ capacity, whereas mission funding may lead to 
overutilization” (Frisk, 2007, p. 2). Under the mission-funded model, the CBO felt that the 
shipyards would attempt to complete a larger amount of work since the workforce was 
already funded, but under the working capital fund model, the set rate may exceed the 
marginal rate of the customers requesting service. 
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Table 3. Pearl Harbor Pilot FY00 Scorecard of Performance Metrics. 





Expectations FY00 Evaluation 
Total cost of a production 
shop, direct labor hour of 
work delivered to the 
customer 
$149.60 $142.12-145.11 $136.07 Met 
Expectation 
Total available labor hours 
expended to deliver a 
production shop, direct 
labor hour to the customer 
3.15 2.99-3.06 2.99 Met 
Expectation 
Total Current Ship 
Maintenance Program 
(CSMP) work items 
completed (Normalized) 




8,985 2,733 jobs 
short of 
Expectation 
Total Current Ship 
Maintenance Program work 
items in the backlog  
17,733 15,960 15,218 Met 
Expectation 
Schedule adherence of CNO 
Maintenance Projects 
11.4% (Late) Better than 
11.4% 





Rework index for CNO 
Maintenance Projects 
0.76% No degradation 1.08% (FY99) Maintained 
Quality 
Activity work schedule 
integrity index 
1.23 Decrease is 
Improvement 
1.16 (FY99) Improvement 
Casualty reports caused by 
activity work 
2 Decrease is 
Improvement 
4 (FY99) Maintained 
Quality 
Note 1 
Earned value Statistical Method 









Notes: 1) Very small number of CASREPs indicates quality of work remains excellent. 2) The 
differences are so small that they are statistically insignificant. Earned Value remains unchanged. 
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B. CASE OF NAVFAC 
Although, NAVFAC does not provide depot maintenance capabilities for the DoN, 
they are conducting a transition from a working capital fund to a mission-funded model. 
The efficiencies that were realized from the shipyards conducting their transition were able 
to relate to NAVFAC. NAVFAC’s mission is to “build and maintain sustainable facilities, 
delivers utilities and services, and provides Navy expeditionary combat force capabilities” 
(Naval Facilities Engineering Command [NAVFAC], 2019). 
1. Reason for Change 
In keeping with the direction of the National Defense Strategy requirement to 
reform business processes and transition to Navy’s Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
system, NAVFAC is transitioning a large part of their operations to mission funding. This 
change is attempting “reduces complexity of funding and accounting models by 
significantly reducing Reimbursable Work Orders (RWO) and streamlining the flow of 
funds” (NAVFAC, 2019, p. 6). Under the current working capital fund structure, all of 
NAVFAC’s business is conducted via reimbursable orders totaling $3.1 billion. By 
transitioning to a mission-funded structure, NAVFAC expects to reduce their reimbursable 
business to $0.9 billion. 
2. Timeline 
NAVFAC will transition to a mission-funded model in fiscal year 2020. The DoN 
will refund the working capital fund costs over three fiscal years beginning in 2020 
(ASN(FMC), 2019). 
3. Goal 
NAVFAC aims to provide DoN a “focused voice for the shore enterprise to provide 
greater accountability, consistency, and innovation aimed to ultimately strengthen military 
readiness” (NAVFAC, 2019). Reducing the magnitude of reimbursable workload will 
enable NAVFAC to reduce overhead costs associated to manage the burdensome 
reimbursable workload. NAVFAC will be able to realign efforts towards DoN and 
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NAVFAC priorities and permit NAVFAC to focus efforts on technical issues benefiting 
installation facility readiness (ASN(FMC), 2019).  
4. Cost to Transition 
NAVFAC estimates that it will cost $291 million to transition from the working 
capital fund to a mission-funded model and realign 9,542 full-time equivalent positions. 
The overhead costs to customers external to the DoN will be paid out to the working capital 
fund across fiscal years 2020–2022, and the DoN accepts the risk if future non-DoN 
workload will not cover planned overhead buyout costs. The DoN will refund the 
remaining costs during 2020. These costs include $49 million in annual leave liability, $45 
million in undepreciated capital equipment, and $75 million in utility fact-of-life increases 
that were anticipated in 2020. 
C. CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS 
As experienced by the naval shipyards and NAVFAC, a funding model transition 
affects an organization, directly and indirectly. The following criteria will be used to 
determine how the funding model transition will affect MARCORLOGCOM and 
determine the feasibility of transitioning to a mission-funded model. Each criterion was 
selected based on the realized effects that the naval shipyards experienced and the 
anticipated effects that NAVFAC will experience.  
1. Impacts to Mission Effectiveness 
Mission effectiveness is the primary goal of a DoD organization and any changes 
that effect an organization must be weighed upon the how it effects its ability to carry out 
its mission. This criterion will determine the impacts to mission effectiveness due to 
changing the funding model of MARCORLOGCOM. This will include impacts on the 
customer and seller.  
2. Impacts on Costs 
In an era of decreasing budgets, significant changes to an organization should aim 
to reduce inefficiencies and save costs. If any changes were to increase costs, funding must 
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be redirected from another priority to fund the new deficiency. This criterion will determine 
if there will be any change in costs by changing the funding model of MARCORLOGCOM 
and the outside organizations that are effected by the transition away from a working 
capital fund.  
3. Impacts on Flow of Resources 
After transitioning to mission-funded models, naval shipyards and NAVFAC 
experienced shifts in the flow of the resources that support their organizations. 
MARCORLOGCOM’s costs will exceed $400 million in fiscal year 2020 (DoN, 2019b), 
and this criterion will be used to determine if there is an impact on the flow of resources to 
manage depot maintenance for the Marine Corps. 
4. Impacts on Transparency/Accountability 
With current focus on auditability, the DoD aims to be good stewards of taxpayer’s 
dollars. It is good business practice to ensure full accountability of all funds entrusted in 
an organization to ensure transparency of operations. This criterion will analyze the 
impacts of transparency and accountability of funds and the ability to meet statutory 
reporting requirements of depot maintenance activities under a mission-funded model. 
5. Cost of Transition 
As experienced with naval shipyards and NAVFAC, upfront costs to transition 
funding models exceeded $100 million. This criterion will be used to illustrate the initial 
costs to transition from a working capital fund to a mission-funded model. It will also 
determine which appropriations and commands will be impacted by the upfront costs of 
the transition and whether or not it will impact operations and funding levels. 
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IV. CASE ANALYSIS 
As explained in Chapter II, different rules and regulations govern working capital 
funds and appropriated funding. The differing guidelines have varying effects on an 
organization as evident in Chapter III for naval shipyards and NAVFAC. This chapter will 
analyze the short- and long-term impacts of changing MARCORLOGCOM’s DMAG to a 
mission-funded profile. 
A. IMPACTS TO MISSION EFFECTIVENESS 
Military organizations are evaluated by how effective they are in accomplishing 
their essential tasks or mission statement. This evaluation determines the mission 
effectiveness of an organization. MARCORLOGCOM’s mission statement is to “provide 
globally responsive ground equipment inventory control and integrated operational level 
logistics capabilities in order to maximize Marine Corps material readiness and 
sustainment” (MARCORLOGCOM, 2019a, p. ES-1). Any changes that 
MARCORLOGCOM makes must be weighed upon the effects on its ability to accomplish 
its mission and the quality of the service provided to its customers.  
1. Marine Corps Logistics Command 
The DoN aimed to eliminate the burdensome, untimely administrative paperwork 
required to share workforces between the intermediate maintenance facilities and the 
shipyards and provide the Atlantic and Pacific Commanders the ability to prioritize efforts 
towards evolving operational needs (GAO, 2006). The established metrics to evaluate the 
RMP implementation did not measure the ability of the fleet commanders to effectively 
manage their workforce. Navy officials felt that the flexibility of a mission-funded 
workforce provided fleet commanders the ability to easily redirect the workforce towards 
unplanned maintenance events, such as collision events. They felt that the unplanned 
events took precedent over ship overhauls requiring efforts to be redirected with haste. 
Before the Pearl Harbor transition, the number of workers assigned to the excess labor 
workshop served as the only measurement of the ability of the shipyard commanders to 
redirect workers to emerging priorities, but shortly after the transition, this metric was no 
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longer measured due to the reduction of employees assigned to the excess labor shop 
(Turner, 2002). This metric was not evaluated for the remaining shipyards during their 
transition to mission-funded models. “According to the Navy, the transition to a common 
funding mechanism facilitated consolidation of intermediate and depot-level facilities at 
Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound and improved the flexibility and responsiveness of the 
shipyards’ workforces” (Frisk, 2007, p. 6), but the Navy failed to provide any quantitative 
data that qualifies its assertion. With this, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
concluded that the funding model of a shipyard has no link to its mission effectiveness 
(Frisk, 2007). Therefore, the shipyards funding model did not illustrate a quantitative effect 
on operations. With this, NAVFAC does not anticipate improvements their ability to 
achieve its mission to “build and maintain sustainable facilities, deliver utilities and 
services, and provide Navy expeditionary combat force capabilities” (NAVFAC, 2019). 
The shipyard transition model does not directly relate to MARCORLOGCOM as 
MARCORLOGCOM does not have any co-located intermediate maintenance facilities to 
integrate workforces. The MEFs and MARFORRES provide the intermediate maintenance 
capabilities to the Marine Corps, but MARCORLOGCOM also provides enterprise storage 
and supply capabilities to the Marine Corps in contrast to naval shipyards 
(MARCORLOGCOM, 2019b). The efficiencies that the DoN realized from regionalizing 
maintenance capabilities would not be applicable to MARCORLOGCOM. 
MARCORLOGCOM provides its enterprise storage and supply capabilities with its SMAG. 
The SMAG operates with a working capital fund model but as a separate account within the 
Navy Working Capital Fund. Changing the DMAG to a mission-funded model would not 
affect the SMAG working capital fund model, but altering the DMAG funding model would 
create additional administrative burden to MARCORLOGCOM’s comptroller organization. It 
is not within the scope of this thesis to determine whether the SMAG should transition funding 
models, but the additional administrative burden of operating a mission-funded DMAG and a 
working capital funding SMAG may result in increased manpower requirements to properly 
manage both accounts and meet statutory reporting requirements. Although administrative 
burden would increase, the funding model change would not affect MARCORLOGCOM’s 
artisan’s ability to conduct depot maintenance. 
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2. Customer 
Although, the funding model change should not affect the MARCORLOGCOM’s 
ability to conduct depot maintenance based on the shipyards’ experience, the customer is 
focused on the quality and timeliness of the maintenance services that 
MARCORLOGCOM provides. During the Pearl Harbor pilot, the DoN established metrics 
that compared the performance of the shipyard before and after the transition, specifically 
schedule adherence and rework index. Table 3 illustrates that the integrated shipyard saw 
a drop in their ability to complete CNO projects on time, but the shipyard was able to 
maintain similar levels of quality in their work. Metrics were established during the Puget 
Sound consolidation to evaluate quality and schedule adherence, but by July of 2005, 
efforts to collect data to evaluate these metrics were halted (GAO, 2006). Due to this, CBO 
was unable to evaluate the quality of the work provided by the shipyards, but CBO 
determined it was unable to find a link between the funding model and the ability to 
complete work in a timely manner (Frisk, 2007). Any improvements that were achieved 
after the integration of the shipyards were independent of the funding model transition.  
 
Figure 1. Statement of Work Change Request Frequency. Adapted from 
Templeton, Caballero, Lisko, Fisher, and Burge (2016). 
DoN advertised that one of the biggest advantages that the RMP provided the 
Atlantic and Fleet commanders the ability to redirect efforts during the year of execution 
toward emerging priorities. Currently, MARCORLOGCOM has an informal process in 
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place to redirect efforts to emerging priorities, and Figure 1 illustrates that 
MARCORLOGCOM made over 2,300 change requests each year. These changes allow 
MARCORLOGCOM to redirect their efforts to emerging operational requirements. These 
changes may affect the timely completion of other scheduled projects, but 
MARCORLOGCOM maintains the ability to hire temporary workforces to conduct surge 
maintenance capabilities. MARCORLOGCOM does not have a local intermediate 
maintenance workforce that can be redirected for depot maintenance efforts. Comparable 
to the shipyards, changing the funding model should not have any effect on 
MARCORLOGCOM being able to provide depot maintenance services in timely manner. 
The funding model would not provide additional workforces that could be redirected to 
depot maintenance capabilities, but during lapses in congressional appropriations under a 
mission-funded model, maintenance activities could be halted. Due to this, a mission-
funded model would not have a positive effect on MARCORLOGCOM’s ability to provide 
timely quality service to its customers.  
B. IMPACTS ON COST 
Overall costs and the set rate charged to the customer are two elements of cost 
relevant to working capital funded activities and mission-funded models. The overall cost, 
regardless of being mission-funded or working capital funded, should remain relatively the 
same. Pearl Harbor and Puget Sound shipyards saw a slight increase to their overall costs, 
as indicated in Figure 2, but the increase in costs are associated with including intermediate 
maintenance costs in the overall shipyard costs. Norfolk and Portsmouth shipyards were 
not integrated with intermediate maintenance facilities and did not see a significant 
increase in overall shipyard costs. When examining costs specifically for depot 
maintenance, there was not any significant changes to the overall costs. After transition to 
a mission-funded model, the overall depot maintenance costs were spread over multiple 
commands, as indicated in Table 2. The spreading of the costs over multiple commands 
affected the shipyards ability to see all costs. Visibility of costs will be discussed later in 
this chapter, but Figure 3 shows the costs for depot maintenance before and after Puget 
Sound transitioned to a mission-funded model. Overall costs remained relatively the same, 
but the individual costs changed within each of the categories adjusted. While NAVSEA 
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saw a reduction in costs, PACFLT saw an increase in its labor costs. Although each 
responsible entity saw adjustments in their costs, the overall costs remained the same.  
 
Figure 2. Shipyards Total Annual Costs. Source: Frisk (2007). 
 
Figure 3. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard Costs. Source: Candreva (2007). 
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While the overall costs remained the same, the rates charged to DoD customer 
exhibited the largest changes. As discussed in Chapter II, working fund customers are 
charged a fully burdened rate, which includes the direct labor costs and all overhead costs 
associated with the requested service provided. Customers drive the rate by the level of 
service they request as overhead costs are spread among all orders. However, after the 
transition to a mission-funded model, the DoD customer is charged a rate equivalent to the 
direct labor required to conduct the requested service, but non-DoD customers would 
continue to be charged a fully burdened rate. DoD customers would no longer be required 
to cover overhead costs in their rate, as overhead costs are either covered by the shipyards 
annual appropriated dollars or other commands listed in Table 2. Even though the overall 
costs remain the same for the DoN, the lower charged rate gives the impression to 
customers that a mission-funded entity provides a less expensive service. In its report to 
Congress, CBO determined that the difference in rates charged to customers lead to 
overutilization of mission-funded shipyards and underutilization of working capital funded 
shipyards (Frisk, 2007). “If customers view shipyard rates as too high, they may defer 
maintenance, reduce the scope, or shift to a new maintenance provider, such as an 
intermediate maintenance facility that is direct funded or does not include fixed costs in its 
prices” (GAO, 2006, p. 8). CBO felt that the lower rates of mission-funded shipyards would 
lead to more customers requesting service due to the labor and overhead funded by other 
providers (Frisk, 2007). This leads to more work being accepted that can be completed 
during the fiscal year potentially leading to ADA violations.  
MARCORLOGCOM transitioning to a mission-funded model would result in a 
reduced rate to its customers, but the Marine Corps as whole would not see a cost reduction. 
The overutilization that CBO describes for mission-funded models has the potential of 
MARCORLOGCOM accepting depot maintenance requests that would exceed the annual 
80% requirement described in Chapter II. Exceeding the 80% maintenance requirement 
would increase the readiness levels of the Marine Corps, but MARCORLOGCOM could 
exceed the 80% rate under a working capital fund model if permitted to do so. The funding 
model does not have an impact on the overall depot maintenance cost for the Marine Corps 
39 
but could impact the level of maintenance that is provided to its customers as the supplier 
drives the billable rate.  
C. IMPACTS ON FLOW OF RESOURCES 
As discussed in Chapter III, multiple commands assumed responsibility for 
managing and executing funding in support of the shipyards. Similarly, the flow of funding 
to support MARCORLOGCOM’s depot maintenance efforts would see a shift in funding 
flow. Since the MARCORLOGCOM’s SMAG would remain as a working capital funded 
activity, only the depot maintenance portion of MARCORLOGCOM’s funding would see 
a shift in responsible commands.  
1. Maintenance Funding 
As described above, the billable rate under a working capital fund model is a fully 
burdened rate while the billable rate under a mission-funded model covers incremental 
direct labor. Table 4 shows the responsible commands for each type of overhead costs 
related to Marine Corps customers. The Marine Corps commands that pay for depot 
maintenance service would see a reduction in their overall funding equal to the overhead 
costs that they would no longer be responsible for as there is no corpus to reimburse. The 
reduction in funding would be spread among the commands listed in Table 4. Depot 
maintenance funding is under operations and maintenance, Marine Corps appropriation. 
Since procurement and military labor are separate appropriations than that of operations 
and maintenance, the funds would need to be reprogrammed into the respective 
appropriations before being transferred to Manpower & Reserve Affairs and Marine Corps 
Systems Command. The funding model does not affect the flow of funding for customers 
outside the Marine Corps.  
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Table 4. MARCORLOGCOM Overhead Cost Distribution 
Overhead Type New Payor Under Mission Funding 
Base Operating Support Marine Corps Installations Command 
Sustainment, Restoration, 
and Modernization 
Marine Corps Installations Command 
Civilian Labor MARCORLOGCOM 
Military Labor Manpower & Reserve Affairs 
Procurement, Marine Corps Marine Corps Systems Command 
 
2. Military Construction/Capital Investment 
As discussed in Chapter III, funding for capital investment was insufficient to 
sustain historical requirement levels and led to Congress instilling the minimum six percent 
requirement to be invested in covered depots (John Warner National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 2006). This required six percent capital investment has failed to 
maintain the shipyards at historical or current levels of readiness leading to the current 
“average age of capital equipment at the shipyards exceeds its expected useful life” (GAO, 
2017, pp. 10–11). This does not account for the required investments needed to meet the 
future depot maintenance requriements that will be levied on the shipyards. The 
requirement to modernize the shipyards is in excess of $20 billion. GAO has determined 
that the “Navy cannot be certain that its capital investment efforts are providing the 
facilities and equipment needed to support the nuclear depot repair mission or that it is 
providing Congress with adequate information on which to base decisions about 
appropriations” (2017, p. 38). This has resulted from the shipyards capital improvement 
efforts being budgeted and competed against other Navy requirements.  
A working capital fund activity has the ability to set rates to account for required 
capital investment plans, but “sensitivity to rate increases limits each depot’s ability to 
modernize and restore infrastructure to the extent required” (Interagency Task Force in 
Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, 2018, 98). While MARCORLOGCOM may not be 
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able to increase rates to cover all capital investment requirements, but they have less 
influence on the capital investment program if the funds are transferred to another entity. 
Under a mission-funded model, Marine Corps Systems Command would be responsible 
for budgeting and providing capital equipment, and Marine Corps Installation Command 
would be responsible for capital facilities investment. Their requirements would compete 
with other Marine Corps requirements, as seen when NAVSEA and fleets took over capital 
investment for the shipyards. Currently, 90 percent of MARCORLOGCOM’s capital 
equipment is beyond its service life, and increases to its capital improvement program has 
been insufficient to properly modernize its equipment (MARCORLOGCOM, 2019b). If 
MARCORLOGCOM changes to a mission-funded model, the Marine Corps would meet 
the 6 percent statutory requirement for investment, but MARCORLOGCOM would see 
continued degradation to its capital equipment like the shipyards analyzed, as its 
requirements compete for funding against other Marine Corps requirements. Switching 
funding models would be a further detriment to MARCORLOGCOM priorities.  
D. IMPACTS ON TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
One of the biggest debates of the shipyard transition of funding models was the 
ability of the shipyards to show total cost visibility under a mission-funded model. After 
Pearl Harbor transitioned, leadership felt there was “no longer a need to determine 
overhead costs by maintenance shop because such costs are no longer accumulated for the 
purposes of developing data to be factored into the consolidated facility’s reimbursable 
rate” (GAO, 2001, p. 36). This mentality caused the staffs to maintain legacy systems in 
place to track overall costs because the consolidated system was not intended for mission-
funded shipyard reporting (GAO, 2006). Navy officials requested limited funds to 
modernize shipyards systems for reporting requirements and the consolidated system did 
not distinguish between intermediate and depot maintenance costs (Frisk, 2007). Instead 
of making efforts to ensure that the new system was able to meet statutory reporting 
requirements, the shipyards used manually intensive efforts to gather data required in order 
report overall costs. The DoN failed to spend necessary amounts to ensure the new funding 
model had the capability to track all costs because they anticipated a future enterprise 
system would be able to provide the level of visibility required to report the total costs of 
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the shipyards (GAO, 2006). Current reports state that it will not be until fiscal year 2021 
that the DoN Enterprise Resource Planning system will be in place (DoN FMC, 2019). The 
system that will allow auditability of Navy financial systems will be in place over 23 years 
after Pearl Harbor completed their transition to a mission-funded model. 
As with the shipyards, MARCORLOGCOM would not maintain total cost visibility 
as it does under a working capital fund model. As indicated in Table 4, overhead costs 
would be spread across multiple commands leading to similar manual efforts to track down 
the cost of all depot maintenance to meet statutory requirements, and other costs such as 
military personnel and capital improvements will be assigned to other accounts. 
MARCORLOGCOM is currently transitioning to a new accounting system that will aide 
in reporting, but they would still need to manually gather data from outside 
MARCORLOGCOM to be able to report total costs (MARCORLOGCOM, 2019b). 
Moving to a mission-funded model, would hinder MARCORLOGCOM’s ability to 
manage all costs as they have had under the working capital fund model.  
E. COST OF TRANSITION 
As indicated in Chapter II, MARCORLOGCOM would need to reimburse the 
working capital fund for liabilities, accumulated operating results, accrued employee leave, 
and undepreciated capital assets. MARCORLOGCOM would need to buyout the accrued 
employee leave of the 1,001 depot maintenance employees they will have for fiscal 2020, 
nine percent of their $76,496,711 in capital assets that have not fully depreciated, the $25.5 
million in accumulated operating results, and any other liabilities that they own before the 
DMAG can be transitioned to a mission-funded model (MARCORLOGCOM, 2019b; 
DoN, 2019b) in exchange, the working capital corpus would be returned to the USMC to 





The DoN transitioned naval shipyards and is currently transitioning NAVFAC to a 
mission-funded model. While each transition aimed to achieve different objectives, each 
has been done to modernize efforts within each organization. The RMP implementation 
was aimed at modernizing and regionalizing ship maintenance efforts. Efficiencies were 
realized in organization structure and allowed for redundancies to be eliminated. The 
funding structure change was not an initial goal of the RMP, but it was a byproduct of the 
RMP. This byproduct caused many challenges during implementation, but resulted in a 
reduction of cost visibility and the ability to meet statutory reporting requirements. GAO, 
DoDIG, and CBO attempted to evaluate the RMP implementation, and each was met with 
challenges in demonstrating quantitative improvements from the funding model change. 
The Navy failed to track and illustrate improvements that the change in funding model had 
on the management of shipyards. Although the DoN claimed that the funding model 
permitted the fleet commanders to manage their workforces to redirect their efforts to 
emergent priorities, it failed to demonstrate any quantitative data to validate their assertion. 
The last effect that the funding model transition had on the shipyards was the gradual 
degradation of capital equipment. The DoN failed to maintain a capital improvement 
program that would be able keep up with the annual requirement. This failure to maintain 
the status quo of shipyard facilities and equipment slowly led to a requirement that exceeds 
$20 billion. Although the RMP saw short-term efficiencies, the long-term results have led 
to shipyards that will not be able to meet future requirements without significant investment 
to improve the shipyards. The funding model transition of the shipyard was not the ultimate 
objective of the RMP, but its implementation affected management of the shipyards and 
the longer-term reporting requirements and budget for shipyard specific requirements.  
The NAVFAC transition to a mission-funded model is a goal of the DoN efforts, in 
contrast to being a byproduct of the RMP implementation of the shipyards. NAVFAC’s 
goal from its transition is to increase the auditability of their transactions. NAVFAC is a 
command in which a significant amount of their business is through reimbursable business. 
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The goal of their transition is to reduce their level of reimbursable business from $3.2 
billion to $0.9 billion. This effort will make great strides for NAVFAC in the auditability 
of their internal business process and accounting. The $291 billion cost to transition is an 
acceptable cost of the Navy to increase the auditability of NAVFAC’s $3.1 billion annual 
budget. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
MARCORLOGCOM transitioning to a mission-funded model is not likely to 
realize the efficiencies gained by the shipyards during the RMP. MARCORLOGCOM is 
not co-located with intermediate maintenance facilities and would not benefit from 
integrating the workforces in their current locations. Total cost visibility would be reduced 
as MARCORLOGCOM would not be responsible for all the costs associated with the depot 
maintenance efforts after the transition. With the fact that MARCORLOGCOM operates 
both the SMAG and DMAG under the working capital fund, switching the DMAG to a 
mission-funded model would only increase the workload to meet statutory requirements 
and administrative burden. MARCORLOGCOM would not realize the benefits anticipated 
during the NAVFAC transition. It would not realize any efficiencies from the transition 
and would result in MARCORLOGCOM reducing the flexibility that the working capital 
fund model provides.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Making any changes to Marine Corps maintenance depots should be done to create 
efficiencies in structure or processes in order to reduce costs and/or streamline procedures. 
Changing the funding model of MARCORLOGCOM is not the only process that should 
be evaluated to determine if better processes exist. The follow research topics should be 
examined in order to modernize MARCORLOGCOM for future requirements. 
1. Combining Intermediate Maintenance and Depot Maintenance 
The DoN regionalized maintenance efforts in order to combine workforces and 
streamline processes. Further study should be completed to determine whether efficiencies 
would be realized if MARCORLOGCOM took on intermediate maintenance efforts from 
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MARFORRES and the MEFs. Study should determine whether some or all intermediate 
maintenance efforts should be consolidated at MCLB Albany and MCLB Barstow and 
determine if MARCORLOGCOM should take on additional structure and responsibility 
and benefit from its maintenance artisans.  
2. Single Maintenance Depot  
A study should be conducted to determine if MARCORLOGCOM should 
consolidate all efforts to a single depot or does the Marine Corps need two separate depots 
to surge requirements during times of elevated operational tempo or for the logistical 
advantage of an east and west location. 
3. Marine Corps Maintenance Depot Requirement 
A study should be completed to determine the cost benefit of the Marine Corps 
having its own depot maintenance capability. The study should analyze if there enough 
Marine Corps specific gear that would require its own depot or should the Marine Corps 
close its depot maintenance capabilities and rely on other DoD depot maintenance centers 
to provide depot maintenance services.  
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